Over the past two weeks the international media have made much of the debate over resumption of negotiations between parties of the Palestine-Israel conflict — as opposed to United Nations recognition of a Palestinian state.
Experience and research in international negotiation and dialogue tells us two things about this debate: current efforts at urging parties back to negotiation will not come to much; and more importantly, something can be done about it.
The Oslo peace process kicked off in January 1993, and aimed to reach a Permanent Status Agreement and end the conflict. Neither of these goals have been achieved.
The Australian government, like other many other governments, assumes that, after almost 20 years of failed negotiations, the best and only option available is to urge the Israeli and Palestinian parties to sit down one more time and try to talk themselves out of the conflict. This approach sets up negotiation and dialogue as some sort of magical, mystical remedy which might just work this time after so many years of failure.
The flaws in this argument are beginning to appear to many nations as they evaluate how they should respond to proposals for United Nations recognition of Palestine. A recent BBC/GlobeScan poll of 20,446 citizens in 19 countries showed that in every country polled, more people favoured UN recognition of Palestine than opposed it: globally 49 per cent back the resolution, while 21 per cent say their government should oppose it. Even US respondents, whose government has been one of the harshest critics of proposed vote on Palestinian recognition, showed more support than opposition (45 per cent support, 36 per cent oppose).
Does this show, as the official positions of some governments suggest, that support for UN recognition of Palestine is essentially "siding with Palestinians against Israel"? Indeed a number of states have labelled the decision to attempt UN recognition as "unilateral action" that should be avoided in favour of direct talks between the parties. This ignores the fact that a vote involving 193 member states of the UN at in the General Assembly — which this may come down to, if the US vetos the move in the Security Council — is about as non-unilateral as it gets.
Not according to actual experience and research in international negotiation. This tells us that UN recognition could provide much-needed support to reach a negotiated settlement — rather than replace or endanger it.
Proposals for a return to direct negotiations should learn from experience and research on the conditions necessary for successful negotiation of international conflict of this kind. And governments should not ignore these hard-won lessons if they are serious about promoting a negotiated peace to the conflict.
One of the lessons from negotiation experts is that a condition for success is relatively equal power between negotiation "partners" — so that what appears to be agreement is not actually the result of outright coercion or force. This admission should not be confused with blaming one side for the violence or singling out one group to accept "war guilt". This need for balanced power between parties is a relational issue between particular groups: you can't assume to know the sources of a power imbalance and barriers to peace in a given conflict until you've looked into what's going on on the ground.
In the Israel-Palestine conflict there is a large power imbalance between parties. Facing up to this power imbalance should not be confused with blaming Israelis or Palestinians for the violence.
Indeed, reasons for this unequal power relationship originate from a number of the parties.
For example, President Mahmoud Abbas was elected to serve until 9 January 2009, after which he unilaterally extended his term and continues in office even after that second deadline expired. Abbas is unable to even visit parts of Palestinian territory such as Gaza under the control of rival political faction Hamas.
One party being under military occupation by the other party does not create a situation of balanced power. The illegality of the Israeli government's military occupation of the West Bank is acknowledged by numerous sources of international law (United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 for instance).
The power asymmetry within this conflict was further illustrated by the
Palestine Papers. These are records of proceedings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators first leaked to Al-Jazeera in January this year and then widely reported in the international media. The Palestine Papers show the concessions Palestinian dialogue partners have offered to their Israeli counterparts which, when publicised, were widely rejected by the Palestinian public. Such developments do not promote lasting, sustainable peace.
Therefore research on the many cases of successful and unsuccessful international negotiation does not support an immediate resumption of negotiation between the parties. Experience does indicate that dialogue is something that could bring about a lasting resolution to the conflict, as has happened in numerous other conflicts. But it cannot be assumed that negotiation is a magical panacea without its own predictable, well researched conditions for success.
United Nations Security Council or General Assembly resolutions for the recognition of the state of Palestine may provide such an opportunity to promote the conditions of successful negotiation, by empowering Palestinian representatives to act as equal, and therefore effective, negotiation partners and provide at least some of the usual UN mechanisms which are available to other member or observer states.
Facing up to the reality of this power imbalance, and addressing it, could provide important practical support for peace. Even though it may be a long process, some sort of measurable progress would provide important momentum to counter disillusionment and to avoid regression to increased violence.
As Marc Gopin, director of the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University reminds us: "Dialogic encounter should always be geared toward a goal that is measurable by the layman participant, especially if he or she is a member of the group that is initiating the fighting. Otherwise it is perceived as, and perhaps is, a substitute for progress".
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David Skidmore
Posted Wednesday, October 5, 2011 - 12:53
This is from an ABC report on the proposal supported by the US and EU to lay sanctions on Syria:
Russia's UN envoy, Vitaly Churkin, said the European resolution was "based on a philosophy of confrontation".
The threat of sanctions, which the resolution called "targeted measures," was "unacceptable," he added.
China's ambassador Li Baodong spoke in favour of the Russian draft and said the Syria crisis must be ended through dialogue.
To me, it does seem ludicrous for pro-democracy demonstrators to make the Syrian regime see reason through dialogue. Likewise, for Palestinians to talk to Zionists.
compass1312
Posted Wednesday, October 5, 2011 - 13:20
Israel is a bully, not only with Palestine, but in all corners of the World. It is difficult to reason with a bully. Bullies spit the dummy when they lose.
For 40 years Palestine has been trying to reason with a bully. Most people recognise this. The time for dialogue has run its course. Palestine has every right to be recognised as a State. Israel will spit the dummy when Palestine is recognised. This is what politicians are afraid of. It is what Hamas is afraid of. Abbas is logical and reasonable in his applications. The result quite simply will be determined by how many UN members can be bullied by Israel and its minder (US) including Australia into polling an unfavourable vote for Palestine.
David Grayling
Posted Thursday, October 6, 2011 - 12:55
Since 1967 and the occupation of Palestine by the Israelis, there has been a lot of talking. None of it has achieved anything! Nothing!
The reason: neither Israel or the U.S. want to see the creation of a Palestinian State. Israel has worked furiously to steal as much of the West Bank as possible and to build settlements there.
The U.S. for decades has used its undoubted skills in duplicity to appear to champion the Palestinian cause while simultaneously pulling the rug from underneath it.
Susan Rice a few days ago stood up in the U.N. and applauded the Syrian uprising against oppression but the U.S. vetoes every resolution that would bring freedom from Israeli oppression to the Palestinians.
The Palestinians are a lost people. Israel and the U.S. say so!
www.dangerouscreation.com
peterauszionist
Posted Thursday, October 6, 2011 - 19:15
For an academic, there is a strange fault in your logic. You make clear that the current administration trying to get statehood for the Palestinians does not control all land and is not legally elected. So waht right do these people have to represent what they call their people.
geoffdb
Posted Friday, October 7, 2011 - 15:22
As already mentioned, proposed "negotiation" had achieved nothing to resolve these issues, and Israel and the USA have kept Palestinian leaders from sharing any initiatives or forming an agenda - only Israel has been allowed to do this.
UN membership for Palestine is a small step toward involving them into the international community - and Australia should cease obstructing it, and move first to abstain in a general assembly vote. The increasing recent aggression of more extreme Israeli leaders like foreign minister Lieberman is already damaging their own national interest with neighbors like Turkey & Egypt.
This is in sad contrast with the efforts of Israeli leaders of the 1980s and 1990s.
Australia must cease our (implicit) endorsement of that tendency in present Israeli leadership, by abstention on Palestine's membership application.
Olivier
Posted Monday, October 10, 2011 - 12:39
Palestine clearly deserves status as sovereign of it's current territory, maybe not its pre-1967 territory. Palestine was a Nation before Britain stupidly displaced half of it to settle a group of European WW2 victims- the grandfathers of today's Israel. Proposing Israel give their Nation back to the indigenous Palestinians is a bit like suggesting Australia give our nation back to our Indigenous members- once settlers have raised another generation in the area, it cannot be easily returned. Palestine seems to obviously deserve current territory statehood. Why would anyone disagree with that!?
Will they still be at war with Israel? At least they will have the dignity of getting back part of their Nation. A few billion dollars in compensation as a sincere apology by the displacers (Britain and/or Israel) to the displaced people's descendants still alive in what's left of Palestine might be enough to pay off the land theft debt, and stop the institutional mass murders (on both sides). Ireland would probably be similar (to Palestine) now if England hadn't returned as much of their Nation as they did, and apologized.
MazelMan
Posted Thursday, October 13, 2011 - 15:24
I listened to Izzat Abdulhadi who is the head of the General Delegation of Palestine to Australia speaking at the Wheeler Centre last week and I heard a similar line of argument. This equalising of the negotiating positions is the STRATEGY of the Palestinian side and is not any kind of normal or necessary pre-requisite for negotiations between conflicting parties. The intent from the Palestinian side is to put as much pressure on Israel so they will be successful i.e win as many of their objectives as possible when the deal finally comes around.
This philosophy lies behind the rejection of any kind of normalisation between the two sides like supporting the AFL Peace Team initiative etc. Normalisation is seen as accommodation to the enemy and amounts to losing face which in the Arab psyche is shame, loss of pride and never to be acceded to. Refer to 'The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs' by David Pryce-Jones to understand the deeper issues that I am alluding to here.
If the world was not sucked into the Palestinian victim culture and had adopted an attitude of awareness to the game they have been playing all along then they would not have bolstered up the Palestinian side whenever it went into free fall e.g. suicide bombing, terrorist attacks, rejection of peace offers etc.
There was never any talk of giving the defeated Germans or Japanese an equal standing at any negotiating table. Since the Palestinians and their Arab mates took their opportunities to destroy Israel and failed, do they really deserve another chance? To expect Israel now to just forgive and forget is totally unjustified, unreasonable and unprecedented. No nation that has defended itself after multiple attacks and aggressions should end up a loser.
If Israel had not been ganged up on by a largely prejudiced anti-Zionist world richly flavoured with anti-Semitism it would have been able to ensure that this conflict had been settled long ago. Israel's Arab neighbours keeping the Palestinians waiting in refugee camps ready to threaten Israel's existence at any time has been part of this whole deception.
paulduffill
Posted Saturday, April 28, 2012 - 18:10
Thanks for your the comments. Apologies that my research commitments have kept me from responding earlier to them. I will answer directly peterauszionist and MazelMan's comments as these relate to specific explanations/clarifications:
@peterauszionist:
New presidential elections in Palestine would increase the legitimacy of the Palestinian President (whoever that might be in this hypothetical), both locally and internationally. And this seems to be acknowledged by the PA as well, with its recent public commitments to hold fresh presidential and parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories, with the most recent proposals I've seen.
However, despite questions about Abbas' legitimacy, his move for UN recognition also appears to have had a high legitimacy among Palestinians:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/23/palestinian-territories-unit...
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/palestinians-plan-mass-ral...
http://www.pcpo.org/polls/poll178.htm
I am not arguing in this article that Abbas' administration is the "perfect" administration to bring this issue to the UN, and I am not sure what that hypothetical perfect administration would look like.
At present his administration is the only Palestinian administration recognised by the UN to launch Palestine's state recognition bids (through the Security Council or, if it comes to it, through the General Assembly). Within the UN body (which means among its Member States' representatives) he is already recognised with the authority to do this. Practically speaking, the Palestinians have no other choice for launching this UN recognition bid.
And even if another Palestinian administration (who and whenever that might be, again this is completely hypothetical) launched the bid, the point here is that negotiation experts inform us that upgraded Palestinian status at the UN (whether it's Abbas who launches the initial bid or a hypothetical someone else) could give important support to the negotiation process, which so far does not meet well established conditions for success in negotiation.
paulduffill
Posted Saturday, April 28, 2012 - 18:59
@ MazelMan: You raise a number of points that I will clarify separately
@ MazelMan: “This equalising of the negotiating positions is the STRATEGY of the Palestinian side and is not any kind of normal or necessary pre-requisite for negotiations between conflicting parties”
A large and amount of research and analysis has established that successful negotiation is far more difficult when there is a large power imbalance or use of coercive power by one party against others. This includes scholarship from experts in fields as diverse as negotiation, international security, international relations, mediation, conflict resolution, dialogue, peace settlements, and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.
A sample of this research is below. I have included a broad variety of perspectives and scholarship, as some sources may be more accessible to readers than others. The page numbers at the end of each reference is where the importance of balanced power is noted, although it might help some readers new to a subject to read the whole chapter/article.
-Bush, R. A. B. & Folger, J. P. (2005) “The Mediation Field: An Overview and Four Stories” in The Promise of Mediation: The Transformative Approach to Conflict, rev. edn. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, pp.15-17.
-Docherty, J. (2005). The little book of strategic negotiation: Negotiating during turbulent times. Intercourse: Good Books, p.22.
-Donnelly, J. (2005). "Realism" in Burchill, S. and colleauges (eds.) Theories of International Relations (3rd Edition). Houndmills: Palgrave, pp.30-31.
-Fisher, R. J. (1997). "John Burt.on: Controlled communication to analytic problem
solving" in Interactive Conflict Resolution. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, p.32.
-Fisher, R., Ury, W. (& Patton, B. for 2nd Edition), (1999). Getting to yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in (2nd Edition). London: Random House, p.101.
-Francis, D. (2002). People, peace and power: Conflict transformation in action. London: Pluto Press, pp.56-57.
- Galtung, J. (2000). "Codes for conflict/peace workers: Twelve dont's", p.2 in Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcend Method), participants' and trainers' manual, United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme, Geneva.
- Galtung, J. (2000). "Module VI: Violent practice", section p.4 & pp.6-7 in Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcend Method), participants' and trainers' manual, United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme, Geneva.
- Hampson, F. O. (2001) “Parent, Midwife, or Accidental xecutioner? The Role of Third Parties in Ending Violent Conflict” in Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. & Aall, P. (eds) Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict.Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 391
- Hampson, F., Crocker, C., & Aall, P. (2007). "Negotiation and international conflict" in Webel, C. & Galtung, J. (eds.) Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. London: Routledge, pp.42-44.
-Jeong,H. (2000).Peace and conflict studies: An introduction. Aldershot: Ashgate, p.36 & p.170.
-Keashly, L. & Fisher, R. J. (1996). "A Contingency perspective on conflict interventions: theoretical and practical considerations" in Bercovitch, J. (ed.) Resolving international conflicts: The theory and practice of mediation. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, pp.242-245.
-Kraybill, R. (2001). "Principles of good process design" in Reychler, L. & Paffenholz, T. (eds.) Peace-Building: A Field Guide. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, pp.182-183.
-Kraybill, R. & Wright, E. (2006). Cool tools for hot topics: Group tools to facilitate meetings when things get hot. Intercourse: Good Books, pp.9-10 & p.50.
-Lederach, J. (1995). Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, pp.12-13.
-Mitchell, C. (2003). "Problem-solving" in Cheldelin, S., Druckman, D. & Fast, L. (eds.) Conflict: From analysis to intervention. London: Continuum, p.248.
-Lebow, R.N. (2010). "Classical Realism" in Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (eds.) International Relations Theories (2nd Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.62-66.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2010). "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories (2nd Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.88.
- Schirch, L. (2004) The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding. Intercourse, PA: Good Books, pp.76-78.
-Schirch, L. & Campt, D. (2007). The little book of dialogue for difficult subjects: A practical hands-on guide. Intercourse: Good Books, p.25 & pp.67-69.
-Ury, W. (1992). Getting past no: Negotiating with difficult people. London: Random House, p.9 & pp.124-127.
paulduffill
Posted Saturday, April 28, 2012 - 19:00
@MazelMan: “This philosophy lies behind the rejection of any kind of normalisation between the two sides like supporting the AFL Peace Team initiative etc”
These community dialogue initiatives are also clearly important given the poor relationships, at a group and a personal level, between Israeli and Palestinian parties. As I say in the article, a power imbalance between parties is a problem for both dialogue (this includes dialogue at the community level) and negotiation efforts. And you will see also in these grassroots dialogues serious efforts are often made by organisers to try and prevent power imbalance between parties threatening these activities, as is the case with the AFL Peace Team.
paulduffill
Posted Saturday, April 28, 2012 - 19:04
@MazelMan:
“There was never any talk of giving the defeated Germans or Japanese an equal standing at any negotiating table”.
Actually for post-war Europe, negotiations between West German and French representatives (later also involving Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) formed the basis of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, forerunner of what became the European Union. For a great, succinct scholarly analysis of this see:
Luttwak, E. (1994). "Franco-German Reconciliation: The Overlooked Role Model of the Moral Re-Armament Movement" in Johnson, D. & Sampson, C. (eds): Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft. York: Oxford University Press, pp.37-63.
Further details on the early formation of the European Coal and Steel Community are available online. Some of these are linked to the Wikipedia article on the [European Coal and Steel Community].
(see for example references 10 to 19 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_European_Coal_and_Steel_Comm...
Japan is another interesting case. Some Japanese interests were respected by the victorious allies. For example multi-track diplomacy pioneering scholars WD Davidson and JV Montville point out that: "During and after World War II, the [US] government benefited from anthropologist Ruth Benedict's suggestions, particularly her recommendation that the United States should allow Japanese Emperor Hirohito to remain on the throne, if only in a ceremonial capacity. She accurately perceived that to depose and perhaps even execute the emperor would completely humiliate the Japanese and deprive them of symbolic identity as a people. The German experience after World War I had shown that a people suffering complete humiliation-the thorough loss of dignity and self-respect-may seek revenge against the authors of the loss. By following Benedict's advice, the United States laid the groundwork for its current strong alliance with Japan, a relationship that has flourished despite the U.S. nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (p.146).
-Full reference of this: Davidson, W. D., & Montville, J. V. (1981-1982). Foreign policy according to Freud. Foreign Policy [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148317]
(45), 145-157.
Now the relationship between Japan and the US is of course by no means perfect. For example the US government continues to take advantage of their superior military and diplomatic power to refuse to remove locally unpopular military bases from Okinawa [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-23/hatoyama-says-japan-has-no-choi...
And this is another instance where imbalance of power prevents a mutually satisfying agreement from emerging from negotiation on the status of US bases in Japan.
These Japanese and German cases show that it is not theoretical imbalance of power that is an impediment to negotiation: both were clearly in potentially weaker position compared to the former Allied countries they were negotiating with after WW2.
What matters in terms of negotiation is whether power is used to coerce partners into wholly giving in to the demands of the more powerful party.
This is where observance of human rights treaties and international law comes in. In the Israel-Palestine conflict for example the International Court of Justice has ruled that Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory violates a number of international laws and human rights standards the Israel state has agreed to abide by: Fourth Geneva Convention Article 49 paragraph 6 and Article 53; Security Council Resolutions 446, 452 and 465; the Fourth Hague Convention Articles 46 and 52; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (See Paraghaphs 120-134 of Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 - Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=5&p3=-1&y=2004]).
It is unfortunate that these lessons from post-WW2, and other dialogue and reconciliation activities have not been more effectively applied to support the lengthy negotiation efforts in the Israel-Palestine conflict.